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‘DITTO’: LAW, POP CULTURE AND HUMANITIES 
AND THE IMPACT OF INTERGENERATIONAL 
INTERPRETATIVE DISSONANCE 
Marett Leiboff 
Abstract. Building on Julius Stone’s remark that jurisprudence is law’s extroversion (or 
extraversion), this essay explores the consequences that flow from the loss of a shared humanities 
discourse by lawyers. In adapting the concept of extraversion to those things about us in the world, 
the essay considers the finding of an empirical study, Law’s Gens Project, which revealed a profound, 
almost seismic shift in what different generational groupings of lawyers know, based in the 
humanities, placing this point of rupture squarely in the 1970s. Drawing on allusions and cultural 
references used in judgments, this project reveals how these cultural markers affect legal 
interpretation. Generational slippages arise when shared humanities discourses are lost. It is thus 
necessary to think about what happens when the texts of law can no longer be read when the arsenal 
needed to read them canonically disappears—that is, when it is no longer possible to read the texts 
as they were intended, not because of any change in legal knowledge in its barest sense, but when 
the humanities discourses needed to decode their meanings are lost. 
1.0 LAWYERS DON’T DO MUCH HISTORY NOW 
Our history is our group memory, without which we as a group are lost. If we live only in 
the present we suffer from memory impairment, a kind of social amnesia, not knowing 
whence we came or whither we are going.1 Harold Berman 
As Freud put it, the unconscious thinks in images, and lawyers, as dogmatists are experts in 
unconsciousness.2 Peter Goodrich 
                                                          
  Marett Leiboff is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Wollongong. She is a member of the 
Law and Popular Cultures Group of the Legal Intersections Research Centre and Vice President of the Law Literature 
and Humanities Association of Australasia. The research described in this essay was funded by a UOW University Research 
Committee Small Grant awarded in 2009. The project was approved by the University of Wollongong Human Research 
Ethics Approval HE10/206, l 10 June 2010. All results are held on file with the author. The surveys have no identifying 
information about individuals and interviews are anonymised. I would like to thank all the participants for their time and 
enthusiasm for the project, my research assistant Daniel Byers, and the numerous, helpful interventions, comments and 
questions at presentations of this research in a range of fora in 2010, 2011 and 2012, all of which have contributed to my 
thinking and unravelling of the information revealed in the Law’s Gens Project. My particular thanks to the insights of the 
anonymous (self-identified) Generation X reviewer. Email marett@uow.edu.au. 
1  Berman Harold Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition Harvard University 
Press 2003 p x  
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Lawyers don’t do much history now …. Law, pure law, nomocon jurisprudence is in practice 
an erasure of legal history, of the artistic reason of law, and we find in its place an inculcation 
of a finely honed and infinitely abstracted training in virtual instrumentalities that pay no 
attention to philology, literature, or the interpretations that require attention to what is 
relayed sub auditio or through the text.3 Peter Goodrich 
1.1 Dedicated Followers of Fashion 
Despite decades or more of critical interventions into the practices of legal interpretation, lawyers 
of the practising kind, for the most part, remain resolutely, dogmatically, doggedly, positivist, 
holding to an intractable legal literality. Lawyers want to believe in and hold faithfully to the literal 
truths of law—nomocon or positivist, the description applies across jurisdictional divides. 
Lawyers want to simply apply the rules, and that extends to rules derived from the critical and 
contextual as much as it does to the literal rules of statute and case law—the texts of law—
despite the challenges instigated through the work of Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, and the 
countless critical interventions since. Moreover, lawyers presume and assume that everyone with 
legal training will read those texts of law uniformly, vouchsafed by a shared legal training that 
extends to the ellipses contained in the texts of law. It is assumed that these are read uniformly or 
at least not read differently by themselves and their peers: that the social, cultural and historical 
sub auditio is uninflected by who ‘we’ are.4  
When I refer to ‘we’ or ‘us’, I quite consciously and strategically mean to be vague, for as I 
will show in this essay, our imagined ‘we’ is generationally inflected and intergenerationally 
dissonant. We may, intellectually, assert that this would be expected, but this makes no difference, 
practically. We speak at cross-purposes when we think we simply read the texts of law 
uninflected. Take the title of this essay—it will mean one thing to some of you, something 
different to others of you, and nothing at all for the rest. If you are itching to know what I am 
talking about, then read ahead to the end. For the ‘us’ of whom I speak is a rhetorical tic: ‘We all 
remember when …’, or ‘We all danced to music xyz in the ‘80s’. We—there is again and it will 
keep on appearing in all its regal splendour—draw upon our own inventories, the soundtracks of 
our lives when we read, interpret and parse the texts of law.  
My claim is that ‘the little things’—the soundtrack of our lives—affect how we read and 
interpret law. An element of the sermon delivered by the Archbishop of Canterbury at the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
2  Goodrich Peter An Instance of the Fingerpost: An Excursus on the Legal and the Digital, abstract of 20th Anniversary Annual 
Lecture, School of Law Birkbeck University of London, 18 May 2012 http://www.bbk.ac.uk/law/events/annual-lecture-
professor-peter-goodrich-friday-18-may-2012  
3  Goodrich Peter ‘The New Casuistry’ (2007) 33 Critical Inquiry 673 at 682 and 707. I came across this article, belatedly, 
while in the process of writing this essay, having not appreciated earlier that it cut across the design of the Law’s Gens 
Project. It has been invaluable in developing the essay. 
4  I do not disregard here the long history of scholarship into the political, class, race, ethnicity, gender amongst others. This 
study asks a different question that crosses through those other interventions into the behaviours and practices of lawyers. 
For an excellent elucidation of the everyday and the popular: Loizidou Elena ‘Romancing the Tomes: Popular Culture, 
Law and Feminism’ (2005) 1 International Journal of Law in Context 210 at 210 –212. 
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Queen’s Diamond Jubilee Service illustrates the point nicely. You will, perhaps, read it very 
differently to me: 
Those of us who belong to the same generation as Her Majesty’s older children will recall a 
sixties song about a ‘dedicated follower of fashion’ … [but the] background of the word 
[dedicated] is the way it is used in classical and biblical language.5 
The Archbishop does not mention details—denotations are left hanging. The 1966 song by The 
Kinks was a major hit, but also a lampoon of what we would now call a fashion victim. Maybe the 
Archbishop was a little coy about mentioning the band’s name within the hallowed walls of St 
Paul’s Cathedral in the presence of Her Majesty, but his allusion did not seem to recognise that 
the lyrics seemed to be more apposite to his point about dedication that he appreciated 
(theologians perhaps not being connoisseurs of the nuances of the Cool Britannia of the 60s). 
The classical and theological allusions are something different again, of course, and in the second 
part of the passage, the Archbishop launched into his deep interpretative objective.  
That the Archbishop of Canterbury chose to use a reference from the 1960s is apposite at 
another level. The 1960s, as this essay will show, was a tipping point for claims of ‘we’, to be able 
to read the texts of law more or less with similar denotations. Lawyers born up until the early 
1960s and educated at a secondary level up until the mid-late 1970s, are more likely to share 
meanings (though not—necessarily—experiences) with lawyers of their own and an earlier 
generation or two or even longer. The Archbishop’s second point about the classical and biblical 
conceptions of ‘dedication’ would have been known to large portions of those older generations. 
But the Archbishop’s allusions—to the 60s, to the song, to the classical and biblical allusions—
are friable and porous, open to creative reinscriptions for those born after the 1960s.  
This short extract illustrates how generational inflections can spring from the most modest 
words, conjuring and interposing interpretative images and representations through which 
meaning is filtered and shaped. It is in the process of attempting to decode the denotational soup 
that generational slippages arise. In the reading of the texts of law, nothing is different. In short, 
you had to be there (even in the 1960s) to fully appreciate these words. Otherwise it is impossible 
to read the texts of law with ‘us’ or as ‘us’. One person’s Dido is very different to another 
person’s Dido, as we will see later. One reading will, as we have known since Derrida, Barthes 
and perhaps Nietzsche, occlude and foreclose another, but what I am suggesting is that the 
fracturing of language results in intergenerational interpretative dissonance that affects the 
continuity and community of law. It is through language, history and more (those things read sub 
auditio) the back story grounded in and of the humanities that the changes are wrought.  
That shared humanities discourse (in one form or another) began to break down at some 
time after the 1960s. It is a paradox that it actually allowed the legal imaginary to work within its 
positivist modes of engagement—that the pretence of positivism’s limited interpretative register 
was supplemented by a shared language borne out of literature, history, philology. Those things 
would be read and deployed sub auditio when the imagined practice of the literality of positivism 
                                                          
5  Williams Rowan Queen’s Diamond Jubilee Thanksgiving Sermon St Paul’s Cathedral London 5 June 2012 : 
http://diamondjubilee.hellomagazine.com/queens-jubilee/news/201206051055/thanksgiving-service-sermon-text/1/ 
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broke down (hence HLA Hart’s core and penumbra). That shared discourse was monocultural 
and monotone, but what has been left behind now is a problematic legacy that this empirical 
research uncovered—the loss of these shared discourses has left a void that has resulted in a 
reading of law as technocratic and idiosyncratic. By and large, these younger generations have 
been educated to correct the deadening and stultifying educational experiences of their parents, 
but in the process, it appears that a generation of positivists has been created without (by and 
large) history, philology, literature—nomocon jurisprudence without shared interpretative verities. 
As Goodrich notes: 
Separation of education from practice is also ineloquence in the sense of disciplinary 
ignorance. History links law ineluctably to the other arts, to philology, literature, and 
philosophy or the discourse of ends … ineloquence, unjust speech, is at root the product of 
an institutional failure, a product of a pedagogy divorced from reality and estranged from the 
roots of the disciplines in the arts.6  
The Law’s Gens Project, conducted during 2010,7 substantiates these observations. The study 
collected responses from a geographically confined, cross-sectional group in Australia, of 90 
lawyers and law students across the generational divide,8 which was followed up with interviews 
with 40 selected participants. All participants answered a pub-quiz style questionnaire, which took 
                                                          
6  Goodrich above note 3 at 698. Goodrich goes on to dissect the negative effects of a US law school education, but this 
could equally apply in the Anglo-Australian law school. He identifies ‘a double antihumanism: [which] abandoned the art 
of law for a science of law, and it reduced the study of rules to the study of efficiency’: Goodrich above n 3 at 699. 
Goodrich reminds us that Posner is the arch nomocon who instigated the latter (Goodrich above note 3 at 700 and 702). 
But Posner, a Builder (see note 8 below) can draw on the humanities if he chose, despite his denial of their value. 
Generations born after the 1960s who follow Posner or Hart or any other anti-humanist jurisprudential and interpretative 
practice does so (generally speaking) without a shared history, philology, literature. Lawyers do not do much history 
now—meaning general history and not legal history. My thanks to my Generation X reviewer whose reading of the points 
of emphasis in Peter Goodrich’s argument provoked me into expanding this point. 
7  Talkin’ ‘Bout Law’s Generations: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Investigation into the Reading of Legal Cases by Different Generations 
of Lawyers 
8  The generations used are as follows. They are not identical with the generations of demography as I have intervened with 
respect to educational and legal educational changes of emphasis: 
1. The Builders (1925-1945) studied law in a highly positivistic framework, have had a general humanist secondary 
education, grew up in conventional Australia; includes lawyers trained through of articles of clerkship. Most of this 
group was retired or near retirement. 
2. Older Baby Boomers (1946-1953) studied law in a highly positivistic framework, had a general humanist secondary 
education were at the forefront of the social changes of the 1960s and 1970s, and includes lawyers trained ‘on the 
job’. The older members were retired or near retirement. 
3. Generation Jones (1954-1965) studied law in a positivistic framework, had a lesser humanist secondary education, 
more likely to have had a uniform secondary education, experienced unemployment, benefited from free tertiary 
education and were the last group who could study law via articles of clerkship. 
4. Generation X (1966-1975) studied law contextually, were more likely to have a technology focussed secondary 
education and were the first generation to have a HECS debt and to be technology driven. 
5. X-Y (1976–1985) were less likely to have had a uniform secondary education, studied law contextually, were the first 
generation who studied full time and worked full time, adept technically and multi-taskers. 
6. Gen Y – (1986 –) were finishing law school or were early career, semi digital or digital natives, who studied law 
contextually, technology focussed, multi-taskers and more likely to use social networking and rely on Google and 
Wikipedia for the acquisition of knowledge.  
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cultural ‘radioactive isotopes’ (including pop culture, literary and historical references—‘the little 
things’) from case law to find out whether cultural knowledge, broadly defined, affected how the 
lawyers read and interpreted the texts of law.9 The quiz included a series of general knowledge 
questions that could benchmark generational proclivities.10 The quiz was not designed to test legal 
knowledge per se, but through the deployment of the cultural, was able to deduce the role that 
cultural knowledge played in the construction and interpretation of the case extracts by individual 
lawyers and then by generational grouping. Cultural references make their way into judgments, as 
rhetorical tics, images, or allusions designed to underline or frame the reasoning used in the 
judgment.11 They are usually overlooked by lawyers keen to find the ratio, but they are there all 
the same. While they may be discounted when reading judgments, they point to the inclinations 
contained in the reasoning—the things that can’t be absorbed or recognised without the triggers 
needed to interpret the judgment as a whole. These are the things that are relayed sub auditio,12 and 
created in much the same way. The judges deploy cultural, literary and historical nuggets—
unconsciously, subconsciously, inadvertently or overtly. They do so expecting that they will be 
understood: judges preface these nuggets with phrases like: ‘everyone knows that’, or ‘that is a 
well known extract’, or ‘no one misunderstands’. Barthes has not made much headway here. They 
do not expect that they need to explain what they have said; they will presume that the ellipses do 
not hinder interpretation, and that everyone will understand what they mean. 13 But legal readers do 
exactly the same thing, and this is where intergenerational interpretative dissonance comes into 
play. 
The Law’s Gens Project revealed a profound, almost seismic shift in what different 
generational groupings know, and this point of rupture can be placed squarely in the 1970s. I will 
come back to this point a little later in this article. Younger generational groupings of lawyers and 
law students (X-Y: 1976—1985 and Generation Y: 1986—) share very little history, literature and 
culture with older generations of lawyers (a combined grouping of The Builders: 1925-1945 and 
Older Baby Boomers: 1946-1953 and Generation Jones: 1954—1965). Generation X (1966—
                                                          
9  Questions 26–39 asked participants to respond to extracts from judgments with short answers or explanations. They were 
told that they were not expected to know anything about the cases concerned. The questions did not ask participants to 
explain the law, but to interpret non-legal matters contained within judgments, except in one instance. When I developed 
the questionnaire, I did not frame the questions in terms of those who did or did not have history—I have adopted this 
latterly as noted at note 3 above. 
10  Questions 1–10 focussed on the participant’s educational background, their employment, the year they were born and 
how they characterised themselves as a lawyer. One questions concerning gender and social group characterisation was 
optional. Most participants did not disclose enough information about their pre-tertiary and tertiary level study to be used 
in any meaningful way in analysing the data so this aspect of the study remains open for further study. 
 Questions 11–25 asked general knowledge questions and questions seeking responses to statements. Question 40 asked 
participants to decode a series of abbreviations. 
11  The extracts and questions were generationally inflected and dealt with matters ranging from the classical era to rap. The 
oldest case included in the study dated from 1703 (with most clustered in the latter quarter of the 20th century) and the 
most recent case dated from 2008. 
12  Goodrich above note 3. 
13  Elms Elwyn ‘On the Use of Classical Allusions in Judgment Writing’ (2008) 31 UNSW Law Journal 56 and Osborough 
WN Literature, Judges and the Law Four Courts Press Dublin 2008; but compare especially Threadgold Terry ‘Lawyers 
Reading Law/Lore as Popular Culture: Conflicting Paradigms of Representation’ in Thornton Margaret (ed) Romancing The 
Tomes: Popular Culture, Law and Feminism Cavendish London 2002 pp 23–46.  
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1975) shared traits with each of the other generational groupings. This lack of shared knowledge 
would be expected, of course. Times change, the old having to make way for the young. We no 
longer speak Middle English, or have a detailed knowledge of the Crimean War. No one can 
possibly keep all the knowledge that has ever existed in their heads. Losing knowledge, forgetting, 
losing cultural memory, is part and parcel of being.14 But this is not how we treat the texts of law. 
We presume that we can read statutes and cases without any interference across time, that we can 
pick up a case and read it without being troubled by the filters of contemporaneity that suffuse 
our reading. Case law can never be written time out of mind. But to attempt to read cases time out 
of mind is to countermand the interpretative function. The Law’s Gens Project brought (some of) 
the consequences out into the open. I do not intend to use this essay to report on the detail of 
the Law’s Gens Project and its findings. Instead, I pull out a couple of examples that reveal how 
much we interpret law beyond the text (as critical interventions into law had theorised) but it also 
shows that the younger generational groups will marshal meanings—aberrant and idiosyncratic—
from existing and established textual resources. Lawyers don’t do much history now. 
1.2 Extra/Overt 
I am struck by an incongruity: that this research into the law and the humanities is grounded in 
the social sciences, albeit as a variant of ethnography that Cassandra Sharp uses in connection 
with empirical cultural studies methodologies in law—in particular those of a qualitative nature 
such as interviews and focus groups—that provide a range of means for ‘exploring cultural 
meaning and understanding’.15 Sharp’s research looks outside the texts of law, its critical 
literature, its dogmas and doctrines, to talk to people to find out how lawyers are influenced by 
pop culture, among other things. This research moves beyond an internalised textuality, revealing 
more than can be achieved by looking inwards to the artefacts of law and literature, law and 
popular culture, and law and film. By moving outside law’s (and legal theory’s) interiority into the 
realm of the exterior, requires a step into a liminal space that is redolent of a literal social science 
methodology devoid of theory, and antithetical to the ethic of the humanities. My foray (like 
Sharp’s) into what might be seen as a bare data collection activity aims to do precisely the 
opposite, in order to enrich what has long been theorised, by finding out what ‘we’ do as 
individual lawyers, and across legal generations. We can surmise intellectually and through a 
process of disinterest, but finding out what people actually do enriches the theory, and expands 
upon and perhaps corrects what we imagine about their practices of interpretation and 
engagement with the texts of law to some findings about what lawyers actually do. This question 
                                                          
14  Assmann Aleida ‘Canon and Archive’ in Erll Astrid and Ansgar Nünning Cultural Memory Studies: An International and 
Interdisciplinary Handbook Walter de Gruyter Berlin 2008 pp 97–107 at 97; Connerton Paul ‘Seven types of forgetting’ 
(2008) 59Memory Studies 64; Sarat Austin and Thomas Kearns ‘Writing History and Registering Memory In Legal Decisions 
and Legal Practices: An Introduction’ in Sarat Austin and Thomas R Kearns (eds) History, Memory and the Law (The Amherst 
Series in Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought) University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor 2002 pp 1–24 at 24. 
15  Sharp Cassandra ‘Let’s See How Far We’ve Come: The Role of Empirical Methodology in Exploring Television 
Audiences’ Robson Peter and Jessica Silbey (eds) Law and Justice on the Small Screen –Hart Publishing Oxford forthcoming 
2012 p 110 at 121–122; see also Feenan Dermot ‘Foreword: Socio-legal Studies and the Humanities’ (2009) 5 International 
Journal of Law in Context 235 
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draws upon and mirrors Bourdieu’s melding of theory with the sociological, and in its exploration 
of the pop cultural is grounded in Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital,16 the ‘set of 
embodied capacities that is acquired as a socially transmitted inheritance’,17 those things rendered 
sub auditio. In short, Bourdieu’s research revealed that we acquire our cultural formation through 
acculturation, socially and through modes of education—and though not a part of Bourdieu’s 
original project, new directions in research into cultural capital is now ‘alert to different 
articulations … [of cultural capital] … across different generational cohorts’.18  
But it is through the intervention of Talkin’ ‘bout your generation,19 an Australian TV quiz 
program first broadcast in 2009, that this project was formed. In a sense it practically applies 
Bourdieu (with the addition of generational inflections) for entertainment purposes. The 
program, a blend of parlour game and trivial pursuit pits Baby Boomers, Gen X and Gen Y 
against each other in a series of tasks which tests pop culture (and more general) knowledge. The 
program exposes the speed with which knowledge, language and meaning is lost and 
misinterpreted across and between generations, how difficult it is to acquire knowledge before or 
after formative periods in time, and how marked and profound differences in knowledge exist 
between the different generations. So like Bourdieu, I used modes of aesthetics—especially pop 
cultural references,20 some high culture references, some literature, some history, some rap, some 
movies, some musicals, from Charles Dickens to the Book of Common Prayer, from Procol 
Harum to Audrey Hepburn, the Mikado to Janis Joplin, to hogsheads of brandy, to ‘shizzle my 
nizzle’, the Ant’ill Mob and the Heartless Crew and countless other references. The examples 
ranged from the subject matter of cases to the allusions used by the courts, representing a range 
of generations and their proclivities. Some of the older cultural references were deployed in 
contemporary judgments; others were borne of their own time and space. There was, in short, 
something for everyone. 
But to contemplate this project as a mere pop quiz is to deny two related, and perhaps 
competing theoretical positionings that sit behind its seeming ersatz exterior. The first concerns 
the way that these pop culture references form part of the texts of law, and whether they function 
                                                          
16  Bourdieu Pierre Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste Trans R Nice Routledge London 1984; Bourdieu Pierre 
The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field Trans S Emanuel Polity Press Cambridge1996 ; Bourdieu Pierre and 
Loïc Wacquant An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology University of Chicago Press Chicago1992 
17  Bennett Tony and Elizabeth Silva ‘Introduction: Cultural Capital—Histories, Limits, Prospects’ (2011) 39 Poetics 427 
at 430  
18  At 343; see 1.4 below in connection with the Norwegian study. 
19  Channel 10, Talkin’ ‘Bout Your Generation: http://ten.com.au/talkin-bout-your-generation.htm; Ward Michael Talkin’ Bout 
Your Generation Book of Everything Ever Hardie Grant Prahran 2011 
20  There is an enormous literature in the field. Some examples follow: MacNeil William Lex Populi: The Jurisprudence of Popular 
Culture Stanford University Press California 2007; Sharp Cassandra ‘Changing the Channel: What to Do with the Critical 
Abilities of Law Students as Viewers?’ (2004) 13 Griffith Law Review 185; Sharp Cassandra ‘The Extreme Makeover Effect 
of Law School: Students Being Transformed by Stories’ (2005) 12 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 233; Moran Leslie et al (eds) 
Law’s Moving Image Cavendish London 2004; Greenfield S, G Osborne, P Robson (eds) Film and the Law 2nd Hart Oxford 
2009. Desmond Manderson reminds us that popular culture is not limited to television and film and has much longer 
histories: Manderson Desmond ‘Trust Us Justice: 24, Popular Culture and the Law’ 2010 http://law.anu.edu.au/news/ 
2010_College_Seminars/Manderson_paper.pdf 
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canonically or as archive—and what happens when that canon or archive is lost. As Costas 
Douzinas points out:  
The past is always caught in the forgetfulness of memory and the impurities of the archive 
… Memory amends as it repeats and every repetition is always repetitive and original 
according to the law of iteration.’21 
But I am struck by Aleida Assmann’s reading of the archive that slightly displaces the notion of 
amendment and iteration.22 For her, the bits and pieces of knowledge and information, once lost, 
cannot be recaptured—any capturing will also be a new telling, a retelling in a given time and 
space. Aleida Assmann reconceives the concept of memory in two forms—‘actively circulated 
memory that keeps the past present as the canon and the passively stored memory that preserves 
the past as the archive’ (her emphasis).23 The canon is continually fed and nurtured; once it is no 
longer fed or nurtured, it falls into the archive and is then lost until reclaimed. The canon outlives 
each generation, but it needs to be constantly iterated and reiterated to remain canonical—thus 
canonical texts of literature are taught and performed ‘from generation to generation’.24 She 
(using my reading of the methods she uses) suggests we redeploy artefacts in order to determine 
whether they are or are not canon or archive.25 But it is in her discussion of the historical archive 
of objects having ‘lost their original “place in life” (Sitz im Leben), and entered a new context, 
which gives them the chance of a second life that considerably prolongs their existence’.26 But 
this second life is a different life, unlike canons that are transmitted across generations without 
interference (though this does not foreclose interpretative interventions). The archive is made up 
of those things that have lost their origins; once time out of mind, once transformed, the texts of 
law need to be reconsidered as having lost their ‘place in life’, their Sitz im Leben, too. It is this 
odd middle-ground that we should see law that has lost its cultural reference points across and 
between generations—it is law that is no longer living.27 For it is necessary to think about what 
happens when the texts of law can no longer be read when the arsenal needed to read them 
canonically disappears—that is, when it is no longer possible to read the texts as they were 
intended not because of any change in legal knowledge in its barest sense, but when ‘philology, 
literature, or the interpretations that require attention to what is relayed sub auditio’ is lost.28  
And this leads to the second point about the use of a pop culture quiz to interrogate long-
standing theoretical positions on the interpretative functions of law. In thinking about research 
and scholarship of this multidimensional type, it is useful to draw on Julius Stone’s remark that 
                                                          
21  Douzinas Costas ‘Theses on Law, History and Time’ (2006) Melbourne Journal of International Law 13 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2006/2.html 
22  Assmann above note 14; compare Derrida Jacques Archive Fever (Eric Prenowitz trans) University of Chicago Press 
Chicago 1995 p 84. 
23  Assmann above note 14 at 101 
24  Assmann above note 14 at 101 
25  Assmann above note 14 at 101-102 
26  Assmann above note 14 at 103 
27  Vismann Cornelia Files: Law and Media Technology Trans G Winthrop-Young Stanford University Press Stanford 2008 
28  Goodrich above note 3  
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jurisprudence is law’s extroversion (or extraversion); that it obtains from ‘knowledge in disciplines 
other than law’.29 However, law and its jurisprudence tends towards the introvert,30 interacting 
with other disciplines without inquiry into those other disciplines. Analytical jurisprudence is 
introvert par excellence, the external (particularly the social) treated as suspect.31 The analytical is 
law’s preferred, valorised jurisprudence, giving comfort to law’s overtly introvert, overtly 
positivist and overtly conservative practices, attitudes, and registers.  
Extro/aversion—I have chosen to play with the two forms of the word in Stone’s work 
(they can have different meanings)—looks outwards. Yet most jurisprudence functions with the 
internal, as noted earlier, using modes of enquiry that foreclose the external, even when 
exteriorising through the use of the texts of disciplines that exist outside law’s own boundaries. 
So if scholarship functions at the edge of the discipline, traversing into the interdiscipline, 
whether it be law and literature, law and humanities, law and society, and the myriad 
philosophical and psychoanalytical modes of jurisprudence, but deploys the practices of introversion, 
that scholarship is introvert. Introversion works with what is there already. Even critical practices 
are introvert and not extra/overt if they do not look to the external. Extraverts look outside and 
beyond what is already there to find out what we do, how we do it, what we know. Introverted 
critical practices set up the modes of engagement while extraverted critical practices step outside 
and take a look. In short, they find out by asking, by looking, by talking. They conduct surveys 
and collect data.  
The Law’s Gens Project is extra/overt. It adopts a cultural legal studies stance as a 
jurisprudential practice that overtly questions the introversion by asking: ‘What do lawyers do 
when they read and interpret legal texts’? But it cannot ask that question directly. If it did, lawyers 
will answer by repeating the mantra learnt: by finding the facts, by recalling principles, by finding 
the ratio. This won’t explain what the lawyer actually does when reading the texts of law. So this 
study proceeded from ‘the blindside’, by asking something that seemingly has nothing to do with 
lawyering: ‘What do you know of the pop culture that finds its way into judgments?’ or ‘What do 
you know of the historical references contained within judgments’?  
1.3 The Radioactive Isotope 
Studies of this kind are often criticised for their inability to posit an exact scientific rigour.32 I will 
position the research and its design in part as ‘autoethnography’, the study of culture that involves 
the self.33 Though this needs to be clarified somewhat—that studies of this kind are bound to 
                                                          
29  Stone Julius ‘The Province of Jurisprudence Redetermined (Concluded)’ (1943-1944) 7 Modern Law Review 177 at 178; 
Stone Julius Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings Stanford University Press California1964 p 16. Extroversion was used in 
the Modern Law Review article; extraversion was used in the 1964 book. 
30  Richard Larry ‘The Lawyer Types’ (1993) 79 ABA Journal 74; McCaulley Mary H and Martin Charles R ‘Career 
Assessment and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator’ (1995) 3 Journal of Career Assessment 219 at 230, 231 
31  Leiboff Marett ‘Ghosts of Law and Humanities (Past, Present, Future)’ (2012) 36 Australian Feminist Law Journal 3 at 9 
32  Sharp Cassandra above note 15 
33  Smart Carol Personal Life Polity Press Cambridge 2007; Radstone Susannah ‘Autobiographical Times’ in Cosslett Tess, 
Lury Celia and Summerfield Penny (eds) Feminism and Autobiography: Texts, Theories and Methods Routledge London 2000 
p 201 
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represent the position of the person designing it. And at a lesser level of scholarly intervention—
pub quizzes and game shows reflect the hand of the person asking the question.34 Let me 
acknowledge my own intrusion into its design. For though I am Generation Jones, I studied law 
with Generation X peers in a black letter law school, complete with a compulsory curriculum 
dictated by admitting authorities. And for those of you outside the Anglo-Australian context, this 
meant that I was studying with students who had just left secondary school, for the most part. 
Some of us were graduates with postgraduate degrees—like me—in other disciplines. We learnt 
our law in the early 1990s decontextualised and literal, rule-based and conservative. But all of 
those practices of literality and rules did not conceal the political agendas of those teaching us. I 
watched my classmates drink up a conservative rereading of the Whitlam dismissal here, a 
reframing of the Queensland political street march bans there, with absolutely no critical 
engagement. That I had lived those experiences in the 1970s made their inability to question what 
they were told an amazing experience, because anything I recounted to them about what actually 
happened (from my point of view at least) was discounted. But my classmates had not learnt 
history—literally. Secondary school history at a junior level had been largely replaced during the 
1970s by social science, though it remained at upper secondary level. But to get into law school in 
Queensland at the time, it was necessary to take maths and science subjects to get ‘high enough’ 
scores. I won’t bore you with the details why, but secondary schools were directing their top 
students away from the humanities. And at this particular law school, it wasn’t possible to study 
humanities with law, but vocational courses like IT and accountancy studied with law were the 
norm—except for those undertaking a ‘straight’ law degree. It was training par excellence for the 
positivist and the nomocon who had no history.  
This experience provided invaluable resources, not least of which was my own experience 
of intergenerational interpretative dissonance. I know vast amounts of detailed doctrine across a 
range of areas of law—the canonical in action. I saw how my classmates acquired attitudes 
through law in the absence of ‘history’. Over the years, I have been variously told by law students, 
for example, that baby boomers had fought in World War II in the 1950s and that 21st birthdays 
were celebrated for no particular reason—it was an American custom, perhaps, that a sentence I 
wrote (containing subordinate clauses) did not make sense (the commas were the problem). But 
examples and anecdotes are not enough, however rich they might be. So drawing on these 
experiences and more, I built a quiz. I was catholic in my choices, doing my best to cover the 
millennia in terms of culture, and 300 years of case law, with most examples residing in the later 
quarter of the 20th century and the decade of the 21st (from 1703—2008 to be precise). Despite 
this, a Generation X interviewee complained that I had chosen only archaic cases. I hadn’t.  
But to return to the reasons for using pop culture in constructing the quiz. Pop culture 
references (of any era) act as something like the radioactive isotope, or carbon dating technique 
mentioned at the outset of this essay. Pop culture is unique in that it is simply absorbed into the 
consciousness of the individual and can never be shared in quite the same way across generations. 
You either know it or you don’t. It is extroversion internalised. Other generational markers (such 
as a war, the learning of a specific language that was not taught after a certain period, some types 
                                                          
34  Bennett Tony ‘Culture, Choice, Necessity: A Political Critique of Bourdieu’s Aesthetic’ (2011) 39 Poetics 530 at 537 
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of literature, parts of speech, and religious texts and so on), can also help fix a generational 
proclivity. One example from the Law’s Gens Project involving a portion of a judgment delivered 
by Lord Hoffman from a 1997 case about the terms of a lease illustrates: 
No one … has any difficulty in understanding Mrs Malaprop. When she says ‘She is as 
obstinate as an allegory on the banks of the Nile’, we reject the conventional or literal 
meaning of allegory as making nonsense of the sentence … 35 
Mrs Malaprop may be unknown to you. She is a character from the 1775 play The Rivals by 
Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Knowing who Mrs Malaprop is matters to an extent but it isn’t 
necessary; the figure of speech—a malapropism—is reflected in the character’s name. A 
malapropism is a badly used word, and Mrs Malaprop uses her words badly all the time. Lord 
Hoffman is telling us that ‘allegory’ does not make sense within the sentence. Some words make 
no sense within a contract either. But lawyers are literalists and the survey revealed when asked 
about the allegory to which Mrs Malaprop referred, most were unable to identify that there was 
no allegory—I had asked a question which required the decoding of the surrounding text. Even if 
you did not know the play, the idea that an allegory might sit on the banks of the Nile might seem 
odd. But what to put in its place? An alligator, of course.  
71.5% of participants in the two oldest generations (a combined group of Builders and 
Older Baby Boomers),36 knew what a malapropism was or who Mrs Malaprop was and 43% were 
able to decode ‘alligator’. Amongst members of Generation Jones, the numbers who knew what a 
malapropism was had virtually halved to 38.5% while 23% could decode ‘alligator’. There was 
little change in the Generation X group: 36.5% knew what a malapropism was, while 27% 
identified ‘alligator’. A 0% response was received in the X-Y group, but while 7.5% of the 
Generation Y group knew what a malapropism was, only 2.4% could decode ‘alligator’. Included 
in Generation Y responses was the suggestion that Mrs Malaprop was a witness in the case, or 
perhaps one of the barristers or solicitors, and it struck me after the event that the problem with 
the ‘alligator’ response was that this group may not have known what an allegory is.  
Of course, this was a tiny extract and a reading of the complete case would reveal that she 
was neither a witness nor a legal representative. And indeed, for the purpose of the quiz, I chose 
a selective portion of the text, leaving out the final sentence of the paragraph, where Lord 
Hoffman concluded that you would ‘… substitute "alligator" by using our background knowledge 
of the things likely to be found on the banks of the Nile and choosing one which sounds rather 
like "allegory"‘.37 But then again, as the results revealed, Lord Hoffman’s conclusion could not be 
vouchsafed, especially in connection with the two younger generations—that background 
knowledge could not be rendered sub auditio if that knowledge did not exist. This was not an 
archaic case, but Lord Hoffman chose to use a canonical literary allusion to highlight his 
reasoning in the case, which had been recirculated for generations, which had not lost its Sitz im 
                                                          
35  Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co [1997] AC 749 at 774 
36  See note 55 below.  
37  Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co [1997] AC 749 at 774 
THE AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST LAW JOURNAL 2012 VOLUME 36 
156 
Leben. The Law’s Gens Project reveals that Mrs Malaprop’s Sitz im Leben has been exhausted, a 
previously common figure of speech virtually lost.  
This loss of meaning or the interpolation of a different reading matters in ways that reflect 
the importance of the ‘little things’. Jeffrey Goldsworthy has recently suggested that forms of 
textual ellipse permit a text to omit details conveyed by context. One of his interpretative 
examples concerns the way we read ‘everyone has gone to Paris’. He says we all understand this 
to mean ‘everyone in some contextually defined group has gone to Paris’, not ‘everyone who has 
ever lived has gone to Paris’.38 Hence, we do not need to include the ellipses, and we would be 
sure to understand the intent. But my interest was in his use of the noun, which I am sure was 
thought to be textually safe.39 Sure enough, I would imagine most people would think of Paris the 
city in France. But there is not one Paris—there is Paris Hilton (the contexts in that situation 
would leave the mind to boggle), Paris Texas, and Paris in Romeo and Juliet,40 as well as the 
Homeric Paris and the other variants from the classics. The presumed context is confounded by a 
mere noun. This would not matter except that lawyers are positivists who rely on the literality of 
their interpretative practices. In the hands of lawyers who share a common set of ideas about 
history, language, literature and the like—the canon—we can share meanings, and share critical 
interventions. We know that Goldsworthy means Paris, the capital of France. But ‘we’ cannot be 
sure, as Mrs Malaprop revealed. 
While I do not know Jeffrey Goldsworthy well, I am aware that he is of a close 
generational grouping to me. I understand him when he uses his example. Though we work at 
very different ends of the jurisprudential spectrum, we share cores and penumbras of meaning 
because these were vouchsafed in the monotonous and the monotone educational world before 
the changes that rendered educational verities asunder. Such monotony was grounded in a 
schooling created in the image of the exclusive, class-based private and selective schooling that 
took shape in the 19th century. This model was grounded in the classical languages and academic 
subjects—the liberal arts.41 As at the beginning of the 21st century, it has virtually disappeared.42 
After early 20th century interventions, it was replaced with a broad and comprehensive secondary 
education, which had taken hold by the 1960s and 1970s. But latterly, the time devoted to the 
humanities has diminished significantly, as my own anecdotal example illustrated. As at 2000, 
60% of the lower secondary curriculum comprised language and literature, mathematics, sciences 
and computer/technology. But the humanities, broadly constructed, comprised only 13% of the 
                                                          
38  Goldsworthy Jeffrey ‘Constitutional implications revisited’ (2011) 30 University of Queensland Law Journal 9 at 13 
39  An autoethnographic intrusion: My early primary schooling in the mid-1960s involved hours of derivation –this is what it 
was called (no prettying up for small children), parsing, decoding the clauses in sentences. Adjectives and adverbs, 
adverbial clauses were all in the bag by the age of eight. As a secondary school teacher of English and Drama in 1980, I 
was teaching early secondary school children nouns and verbs. Clauses and phrases barely came into it. I should have seen 
the change happening. In my own secondary schooling in the early 70s, grammar disappeared. I do not know the 
grammar that people three or four years my senior know. Gerunds are a complete mystery to me. 
40  I had explored the variants of Paris elsewhere, in the context of trademarks law: Leiboff Marett Creative Practice and the Law 
Thomson Law Book Co Sydney 2007 
41  Benavot Aaron The Diversification of Secondary Education: School Curricula in Comparative Perspective IBE Working Papers on 
Curriculum Issues Nº 6 UNESCO International Bureau of Education Geneva Switzerland November 2006 p2 
42  Benavot ‘Table 10: Distribution of upper secondary programmes/tracks by type and historical period’ as above at p 17  
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curriculum and even then were treated as a subset of the social sciences—social studies, history, 
geography, social sciences, environmental studies, civics and citizenship education. The arts—
aesthetic education including art, music, dance, singing, handicrafts—comprised only 6%.43 It is 
not surprising that lawyers do not know much history now. 
HLA Hart could say with a degree of certainty that language has a core of certainty and a 
penumbra of uncertainty because it was assumed that lawyers shared a uniform and 
homogeneous course of study prior to studying law (not that this would have been a question for 
Hart to consider as there simply was no alternative). His lawyers shared an educational and social 
habitus. Thus passing references to Latin, Greek, the Classics, Shakespeare, the works of WS 
Gilbert, the ‘Great War’ could be used to elucidate a point, or provide a reference that would 
function as a conceptual shorthand for broader concepts. And they would be understood. 
Heterogeneity was not to be expected; the most radical of radical lawyers shared a language with 
the most conservative of conservative lawyers. The practices of positivism could work because its 
exponents and opponents shared a non-legal imaginary as well as a legal imaginary. In short, it 
could be vouchsafed that lawyers educated up until the 1970s had received an education of a rigid 
and narrow type and this had functioned, largely unchanged for long enough for its practitioners 
to be able to read with a reasonable degree of clarity the texts of law from the archive—in 
addition to the canon—with a degree of precision. 
This practice does not accommodate the two or more generations habituated to a world of 
floating signifiers, without shared meanings, overlaid with a positivist nomocon temperament, 
without history and literature. Paris would work, sub auditio, for the oldies. For the Facebook and 
Twitter generation who are familiar with Paris Hilton—maybe, maybe not. Law without history 
means law, to an extent, without meaning.44 To use an example from a passing conversation with 
a Generation Y lawyer: the youngest of Generation Y lawyers (those in their early-mid 20s) think 
negligence law is a ‘very bad thing’. Moreover, Donoghue v Stevenson is a bad case, because it created 
a culture of suing. At a level of analysis, this is a fair enough conclusion, but that was not what 
was meant. It was assumed as a matter of fact that Donoghue v Stevenson invented negligence. I said 
that the case merely extended negligence beyond the contractual to third parties. Oh. Donoghue v 
Stephenson now functions as floating signifier, a case outside of time, a case verballed. This reading 
suits a generation of young nomocons, without history and without, I daresay, having ever read 
the case. The description on Wikipedia, it seems, is enough these days. 
This passing conversation confirms the existence of an ‘intergenerational interpretative 
dissonance’, in which the canonical texts of law are subjected to creative reinscriptions: look at 
what happened to poor Donoghue v Stevenson. I say problematic because ‘we’ imagine that the 
transmission of a canonical judgment will, as Aleida Assmann suggests, remain uninflected 
through time. Interpretation is one thing. What the case says is another thing altogether. The texts 
of law are compromised rather than invigorated when technocratic and idiosyncratic readings are 
interposed, in combination with a literality and a unshakable belief in the veracity of 
interpretations. The loss of a shared humanities discourse is implicated, and not just in Australia. 
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1.4 The Norwegian study 
At the end of 2011, Tony Bennett and Elizabeth Silva produced an issue of Poetics that 
reported on a number of pieces of recent research into Bourdieu. Among the papers was one that 
provided me with some intriguing ex post facto revelations that marry with the results of the Law’s 
Gens Project. The Norwegian media scholars Gripsrud, Hovden and Moe revealed a loss of 
canonical knowledge amongst higher education students over a ten-year period in Norway.45 
Their study revealed that canonical knowledge and appreciation declined dramatically between 
1998 and 2008, indicating ‘a marked decline in interest and use of almost every form of culture 
that is identified with traditional legitimate taste.’46 Legitimate taste means Bourdieu’s conception 
of the tastes of the elite, as well as literature and music. But ‘cultural knowledge’,47differed 
significantly according to the students’ fields of study and occupational trajectory.48 Significantly, 
the loss of canonical knowledge was greater for those in the technical disciplines, including law 
students,49 than those studying the humanities and social sciences,50 who were presumably 
acquiring this knowledge within their courses of study. Bourdieu had not anticipated the 
possibility of generational change and Gripsrud, Hovden and Moe observed that: 
… knowledge of Bach and Kafka may be suspected also to have quite a bit of what Marx 
could have called use value: a real resource in attempts at understanding the world and one’s 
role in it. Bourdieu’s theory does not have space or tools for an understanding of a social 
loss associated with, say, Johann Sebastian Bach’s music becoming increasingly forgotten 
and unheard. A key question for future research, then, is to try to answer how such losses 
are to be understood in sociological terms.51 
What my research revealed was that this kind of social loss resulted in new ascriptions and 
interpretations, contrary to the expectations of law as a respecter of authority—of court, of 
judgement, of text. The two younger generations create unanchored interpretative verities of the 
kind described in connection with the idiosyncratic readings of Donoghue v Stevenson: a confident, 
self-determining, interpretative practice disconnected from history, literature, and the grounding 
of law in the humanities.  
                                                          
45  Gripsrud Jostein, Jan Fredrik Hovden , Hallvard Moe ‘Changing Relations: Class, Education and Cultural Capital (2011) 
39 Poetics 507 
46  Gripsrud note 45 above at 522 
47  Gripsrud note 45 above 523 
48  Bennett and Silva above note 17 at 338 
49  Gripsrud note 45 above 514 and 526 
50  Gripsrud note 45 above 524 
51  Gripsrud note 45 above 527 
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2.0 DITTO  
2.1. Making It Up 
As part of the Law’s Gens Project, I conducted a series of interviews. One Generation Y 
interviewee told me that when being taught to read, the class was told that if they did not know 
the meaning of a word, they should just work it out. The provocation for this discussion was the 
result of a series of idiosyncratic responses to one particular quiz question by Generation X-Y 
and Generation Y participants. I recognised what the interviewee was talking about. As a graduate 
teacher trainee in 1979, one rare, but very clear memory stands out for me from my English 
teaching methods class. Clem, my lecturer indicated that research showed that adult interpreters 
tend to make sense of unknown words from their contexts. There was never a suggestion that 
this would also apply to children who did not yet have a fully formed vocabulary. Sometime 
between 1979 and the mid-late 1980s, something changed.  
Generation X-Y and Generation Y participants, overall, displayed confident, self-
determining, interpretative practices in their answers to the quiz questions. What for me were 
inventive and rather odd responses were surprising on two fronts. One was the confidence 
displayed, but the other was that I had instructed participants to leave questions they did not 
know the answer to. The older generations—respecting authority or at least the instruction—
mostly complied, but the youngest generations—Generation Y in particular—generally did not 
comply. They made up meanings, putting the best light on the unknown. I have to accept that 
they said that they genuinely believed they were correct, and the meaning was the one they knew. 
But one thing is certain: they did not make up answers to cover over or to admit to a lack of 
cultural ignorance (despite the suggestion of an interviewee). They genuinely believed the answer 
they provided was the correct response.  
2.2 Dido/Ditto? 
I know, I have kept you waiting. I keep saying I will come to it. You have been wondering what 
‘Ditto’ has to do with this essay. In one of the benchmarking questions, participants were given a 
word without any clues surrounding the word. The word was ‘Dido’.52 The question was couched 
so as not to give any clues to the identity of Dido as a word. I expected that participants would 
recognise either a classical allusion (Dido Queen of Carthage or perhaps Dido and Aeneas), or the 
                                                          
52  Question 24 of the quiz was a benchmarking question. The question and its sub-questions were couched as follows: Read 
the following word and answer the questions in the space or spaces below. ‘Dido’. Sub-question 1 immediately 
followed, which asked; ‘Are you familiar with this word? Immediately to its right were two boxes, one marked ‘Yes’ and 
the other marked ‘No’. The participant, on marking ‘No’ was then instructed: ‘If you circled No please move to Q 25. 
The participants who marked ‘Yes’ were instructed: ‘If you circled Yes, please answer the following. Sub-Question 2 
followed which asked ‘What is Dido?’. A boxed space was left so that the participant could write their answer. This was 
followed with Sub-Question 3, which asked: ‘In what context or contexts do you know the word Dido?’. As with 
Question 2, a boxed space was located to the right in which the answer could be placed 
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1990s pop singer called Dido, or perhaps both. The results indicated something very different a 
set out in Figure One.53 
Figure One54 
DIDO 1925-195355 1954-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986- 
 Builders/Older 
Baby Boomers 
Generation 
Jones 
Generation 
X 
X-Y Generation 
Y 
Did not 
recognise the 
word 
50% 50% 9.1% 20% 20% 
Classical 
Allusion 
16.7% 28.6% 9.1% 0% 3.6% 
Singer 33.3% 21.4% 73.7% 40% 40% 
Ditto 0% 0% 9.1% 50% 32.7% 
Ghost 0% 0% 0% 20% 5.4% 
Ditto/Ghost 
combined 
  9.1% 70% 38.1% 
Additional 
responses 
 Classical+ 
Singer 7.7% 
Singer + 
Ditto 9.1% 
Singer + 
Ditto 9.1% 
9.1% 
2 x Singer + 
Ditto 
1 x Singer, 
classical and 
WWII ship 
 
The results revealed that 50% of the older generations did not recognise the word. On the other 
hand, the younger generations were far more confident identifying the word. In the oldest 
grouping, more identified the singer than the classical allusion, while Generation Jones 
participants knew the classical allusion better than the pop singer. Generation X responded most 
                                                          
53  Data was analysed in terms of percentages, for statistical purposes, and for reporting purposes. The sizes of the groupings 
was nearly identical in the three oldest reported groupings, but the largest group surveyed was Generation Y, comprising 
nearly half of all questionnaires completed. Generation X-Y was the smallest reportable group permitted under the 
relevant Ethics Approval 
54  Results do not necessarily ‘add up’ as the percentages used reflect the responses to different questions and answers. 
55  This group was combined because the numbers for the Builders could not be reported under the relevant Ethics 
Approval because of a small sample size. They were merged with the Older Baby Boomers as a combined result. 
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confidently of all groups, with most knowing the word, and nearly all knowing the singer. For 
Generations X-Y and Y, 80% proffered a response, 40% of whom identified the singer. In the 
three youngest generations, knowledge of the classical allusion dropped dramatically: 9.1% of 
Generation X, none in X-Y, and an exceptional individual member of Generation Y, who knew 
Dido ‘three ways’: the classical allusion, the pop singer, and an additional piece of (correct) 
information—that Dido was the name of a World War II ship. Other than this individual, only 
participants from Generation Jones could identify both singer and classical allusion.  
The predicted drop in knowledge of the classical allusion in the youngest generations was 
expected and borne out.56 But you will have noticed some odd lines in Figure One: Ditto and 
Ghost. Ditto required decoding.57 Dido is phonetically ‘ditto’. In the 1990 film Ghost, one character 
never speaks other than to say ‘ditto’.58 It is an American film, and ‘ditto’ sounds like ‘Diddo’, the 
‘t’ becoming ‘d’. Other clues were revealed in the responses of the participants: ‘That is the word 
you use when you are repeating the thing that was already said’. Significant raw numbers in the 
Generation X-Y and Y groups answered ‘ditto’.59 
But why is ditto/dido significant? The response reveals a marker of a change in the way 
that reading is carried out—reflecting the interpolation of adult reading practices by children who 
were told to work out the meaning of words.60 The change from classical allusion to the 
normalisation of the pop singer as a primary identifier of the word marks a profound shift in the 
sub auditio of the classical on which law believed it could rely.61 The shift is generationally 
inflected, but what is particularly interesting is the shift in confidence from the oldest generations 
who conform to expressions of authority and the youngest who do not.62 A year or so after I 
conducted this survey, and started analysing results, I was describing this result to a legal theory 
class. I pronounced Dido as Dido and not diddo, having written it on the board. One member of 
                                                          
56  I was surprised that so few of the oldest generations knew the classical allusion. In interviews, it became clear that some in 
this age group couldn’t always remember details. The strong response for the singer occurred through the 
intergenerational transmission of knowledge; participants who were parents and grandparents straddled the generational 
divide with ease in a number of instances. There was no return on this though, except where interviewees in the youngest 
age groups identified that they knew things because their parents or grandparents knew—in those instances, the 
individuals in the youngest age groups were outliers. 
57  I have to acknowledge my research assistant Daniel Byers, a member of Generation Y, who after some considerable 
thinking, decoded Ditto for me. It was a masterful piece of detective work on Daniel’s part. 
58  Sam: I love you Molly. I always have. Molly: Ditto 
59  Results have had to be expressed in percentages. 
60  One Generation Y interviewee explained that she had never seen the word written and assumed that this was how the 
word was spelt. I had suggested that if I had had to guess I would have thought it would have a double d, like ‘daddy’ or 
‘P Diddy’, rather than one d, if that creative intervention were to be made. The interviewee who described how she was 
taught to read was not surprised that others of her generation would do this. But she also suggested that they would not 
want to look as if they didn’t know. Another of this generation realised when I said Dido (not ‘diddo’) seemed abashed, 
remarking that her English teacher mother wouldn’t be pleased as she should have known the spelling of the word. 
61  Elms above note 13. 
62  This result intrigued the older interviewees. One in the combined oldest generations suggested that the ‘ditto’ could only 
have been the result of the members of the group talking amongst themselves to try to pool resources to get the answer 
right. I wasn’t sure if they had done this as the results had filtered through a number of different days when the survey 
was carried out. And as the results show, ‘ditto’ started in Generation X, was present in strong numbers of X-Y, as well as 
Generation Y. So ‘ditto’ seems to have been passed on in the same way that the loss of generational information reaches a 
point of no return once the information has been lost from consciousness, 
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the class wrinkled his nose and said—‘isn’t that diddo, the word you say when you are repeating 
something you have already said’?  
As a benchmarking question, Dido could only be indicative of the relationship between 
cultural references and law. But its general thrust was confirmed in the only question in which an 
aspect of law was tested: Assumpsit.63 Assumpsit is an archaic legal term that appears in most 
contract law texts. All participants had studied contract law. As the results in Figure Two show, 
knowledge of Assumpsit dropped exponentially from the oldest to the youngest generations. I 
chose Assumpsit for two reasons—one was its archaic character, and the second was its apparent 
similarity to the word ‘assume’. As it turns out, a greater percentage of the oldest age groups 
mistook the word for ‘assume’ than the youngest, but very few of the youngest knew what the 
word was at all. 
Figure Two  
ASSUMPSIT 1925-195364 1954-1965 1966-1975 1976-
1985 
1986- 
 Builders/Older 
Baby Boomers 
Generation 
Jones 
Generation 
X 
X-Y Generation 
Y 
Legal term  57% 23.1% 9.1% 10% 1.8% 
Wrong/no 
answer/includes 
‘assume’  
42.9% 
 
76.9% 
 
90.9% 
 
90% 
 
98.2% 
 
Assume 14.3% 7.7% 18.2% 20% 12.7% 
 
This set of results is to be expected—once a word is lost, then as Aleida Assmann shows so 
clearly, the word slips out of the canon and into the archive. The 98.2% of the youngest 
generation did not just leave a blank space, even though they didn’t make the mistake of 
interpolating ‘assume’ for Assumpsit. But they tried other answers, confidently creating meanings, 
absent history, and absent the deeper structures of the law grounded in the past. 
3.0 CONCLUSION 
However much we may attempt to write absent generational inflections, we can never anticipate 
how texts will be read time out of mind. For dogmatic, dogged positivists, nomocons young and 
                                                          
63  Question 30 was headed thus: ‘The headnote of Coggs v Bernard (1703) 91 Eng Rep 26 says: ‘Assumpsit to take a hogshead 
of brandy in one cellar and lay it down in another. Breach, that tam negligenter, he put it down in the latter, that I was 
staved, gist’.’This was followed with this question. ‘What is meant by the following? Please answer in the space to the right 
of the words or phrases or if you don’t know, please leave the space blank’. Four words or phrases followed: ‘Assumpsit’, 
‘Hogshead’, ‘Lay it down’, ‘Staved’.. 
64  This group was combined because the numbers for the Builders could not be reported because of sample size. They were 
merged with the Older Baby Boomers as a result 
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old, what is imagined is a law that functions time out of mind, held in place by the literal truths of 
the law. The Law’s Gens Project challenges that intractable legal literality, but its findings, such as 
they are, extroverted as they are, have the potential to be captured, to become a literal truth. That 
is the danger of extraversion, the dangers of data, that it too can be used in ways that were never 
intended. This was not a study in literality, but a set of images, a snapshot of the moment, 
indicating where we were in a particular time and space in 2010.  
The past and the present, absent generations, is always like that. Have a look at an old 
movie that attempts some kind of historical accuracy. It will be easy to see which movie was 
created in the 1930s, the 1960s, the 2000s, but not one created in 2012—it will be obviously 
‘historically’ accurate. Look again in 15 years. You will think again. My favourite example is the 
1968 version of Oliver! Supposedly set in Dickensian East End London, look at that eye make-up 
straight out of Mary Quant and the swinging sixties. They thought they were getting the look 
right. They were—for that time. As a kid in the sixties, the eye-make up did not look out of place. 
Look at it now and it is dated—by that eye make-up. We read the films—and we read law—using 
the aesthetics of our own time. The only way to avoid the thrall of the present is to encounter law 
through a grounding—in the humanities. z 
